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1. Introduction 
The  banking  sector  in  some  Latin  American  countries  has  undergone  dramatic 
transformations over the last fifteen years or so as a result of the processes of financial 
liberalisation  and  international  integration.  One  of  the  main  responses  to  these 
changes has been an accelerated process of consolidation of their financial systems 
and, as a result, more concentrated banking sectors.
1  
Such developments have been set against the background of recent economic 
and financial crises
2 as well as a  growth in foreign investment in the region. The 
presence  of  foreign  banks  has  increased  significantly  since  the  mid -1990s  with 
European and US banks being the main investors. Indeed  Yeyati and Micco (2003) 
observe that unlike the US and the EU, the banking sector consolidation in some Latin 
American countries has been largely  driven by  the acquisitions of local banks by 
foreign institutions.  No doubt, foreign investment s  may help the undercapitalised 
financial systems in the region, and financial consolidation may create some benefits 
for consumers e.g. in terms of higher quality services (Berger and Mester, 2003) . 
Serious policy concerns  arise, however, regarding the potential  collusive behaviour 
between the banks operating in highly concentrated markets and its effect s on their 
conduct and profitability. Collusion  activities, like other anti-competitive practices, 
can generate  abnormal  bank profits and  ultimately  burden consumers through, for 
example, higher than competitive loan rates, credit rationing and the downgrading of 
banking services.  
Such considerations are  typically formulated in the context of  market-power 
explanations of bank performance. A popular market-power approach is the Structure-
Conduct-Performance  (SCP)  paradigm,  which  implies  that  concentration  lowers 
competition by fostering collusion among a handful of large banks in the market.  A 
related market power theory  is the Relative Market Power (RMP) hypothesis which 
suggests that firms with large market shares and well-differentiated products are more 
efficient and  can earn supernormal profits .  Another strand of literature , however, 
interprets the relationship between  bank performance and concentration in terms of 
                                                 
1 Over the period 1997 to 2005 most countries in the region experienced a profound decrease in the 
number of commercial banks: e.g. by 15% in Argentina and 26% in Brazil, and by approximately 10% 
in overall Latin America. The Latin American average is calculated using the following countries: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
2 Countries that experienced financial crises in the mid -1990s include Mexico, Venezuela, Paraguay, 
and Argentina. Around the turn of the millennium fur ther crises occurred in Brazil, Argentina, and 
Uruguay (for more details see Garcia-Herrero, 1997; Nazmi, 1999; and Rojas-Suarez, 2004).   2 
enhanced efficiency. The efficient structure hypothesis formalizes the concept that 
more efficient firms have lower costs, which in turn lead to higher profits. Therefore, 
with respect to the RMP, the causality is reversed in the sense that the most efficient 
firms will be able to increase their market share, resulting in higher concentration. 
Recently  Berger  (1995)  emphasises  the  need  to  include  measures  of  estimated 
productive  efficiency  in  the  market  power  models  of  bank  performance  and 
distinguishes between X-efficiency
3 (ESX) and scale efficiency (ESS) hypotheses.  
The  market  power  and  effi cient  structure  hypotheses  have  contrasting 
implications for regulation, particularly in relation to mergers and antitrust policies. If 
the evidence favors  the  efficient structure  hypothesis, then mergers (and market 
concentration in general) are motivated  by efficiency considerations, which should 
increase consumer and producer‟s surplus. If on the other hand the evidence validates 
the market power hypotheses it would imply that the motivation behind mergers is 
monopolistic  price  setting.  As  a  consequence,  an  argument  for  pursuing  antitrust 
policies  emerges.  Moreover,  given  that  the  banking  system  affects  economic 
development and growth (Beck et. al., 2000) as well as poverty alleviation (Levine, 
2005) it is important to identify policies conducive to its efficient operation (e.g., see 
Barth et al. 2006).   
We investigate the relationship between market structure, efficiency and bank 
performance/profitability in some Latin American countries. We focus on a sample of 
approximately 2,500 bank observations in nine Latin American countries over the 
period 1997-2005.  Relevant research testing these models has typically examined the 
developed countries‟ banking markets (mainly US and EU) while evidence for Latin 
America is scarce.  Some recent country-specific studies exist focusing on Chile and 
Mexico (e.g. Berstain and Fuentes, 2005; Guerrero et al., 2005) but no comprehensive 
analysis of the above issues for the Latin America banking industry is available to our 
knowledge. Moreover,  we employ the non-parametric  Data Envelopment  Analysis 
(DEA) technique to obtain reliable measures of bank efficiency.  The evidence we 
produce  is  more  consistent  with  the  efficient  structure  hypotheses  rather  than  the 
market-power theories. 
  The following section provides a review of the relevant literature.  Section 3 
discusses the model specifications, the methodology used for calculating efficiency, 
                                                 
3 The concept was first introduced by Leibenstein (1966).    3 
and  the  data.  Section  4  presents  and  discusses  the  results  and  finally  Section  5 
concludes.      
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Industrial Organisation Considerations in the Banking Sector 
The traditional SCP hypothesis that a firm‟s profits and conduct are determined by the 
structural features of the market where it operates (Bain, 1951) has been challenged 
by further developments in the theory of industrial organization. The RMP hypothesis 
(Shepherd,  1982,  1986)  considers  firms‟  market  share  as  a  proxy  variable  for 
assessing market power. Essentially, market share is assumed to capture both firm‟s 
efficiency  and other factors like market  power and product  differentiation.  In this 
context, Hicks‟ quiet life hypothesis (1935) is often considered as a special case of 
RMP because it establishes that concentrated markets reduce competitive pressure as 
managers put less effort to maximize the firm‟s efficiency. Demsetz (1973) proposes 
as  an  alternative  the  efficient  structure  hypothesis,  which  postulates  that  the 
correlation between market concentration and bank profitability is the result of the 
underlying relationship between profit and the efficiency of the firms. In this case, the 
positive relationship between profits and concentration is spurious because efficiency 
is  the  variable  that  actually  explains  profitability  and  that  motivate  larger  market 
share. 
The  SCP  and  RPM  models  have  been  tested  extensively  in  the  banking 
industry, with most of the research focusing on the US and, more recently, the EU. 
The results, however, appear mixed and there is no conclusive evidence to indicate the 
superiority of one model over the other (e.g., Gilbert, 1984; Goddard et al., 2001). 
Berger (1995) argues that existing market power models may be mispecified due to 
omitted variables and that models of bank profitability should include direct measures 
of X- (ESX) and scale (ESS) efficiencies. The ESX hypothesis implies that firms 
experience lower costs and thus higher profits because of superior management or 
production  technologies.  The  ESS  hypothesis  emphasizes  that  firms  producing  at 
more efficient scales achieve lower unit costs and higher unit profits. Berger (1995) 
tests the four competing hypotheses (SCP, RMP, ESX and ESS) in the US and finds 
that only the market share and X-efficiency variables are positively and significantly 
related to bank profits. The explanatory power of the models tested, however, is lower 
than expected. Similarly, some EU studies (e.g. Goddard et al., 2001) corroborate   4 
such  concerns  about  the  capability  of  these  models  to  explain  variations  in  bank 
performance.  
Subsequent  research  has  evolved  in  several  directions.  Some  studies 
emphasize the role of different factors in explaining competitive conditions in banking 
markets,  such  as  bank  risks,  regulation,  the  quality  of  banking  services,  and  the 
ownership  and  size  of  banks  (Berger  et  al.,  2004).  Other  studies  have  applied 
advanced  method  for  measuring  competition  using  e.g.  the  Panzar  and  Rosse  H-
statistics  (Casu  and  Girardone,  2006)  and  the  Lerner  Index  of  monopoly  power 
(Fernandez  de  Guevara  et  al.,  2005).  These  models,  originally  developed  in  the 
context of the “New Empirical Industrial Organisation” literature, have the advantage 
of employing direct measures of (static and dynamic) competition. 
The majority of studies, however, still rely on tests of market power and/or 
efficiency  as  analytical  models  of  bank  competition  both  in  the  US  (see  e.g.  the 
reviews by Gilbert and Zaretzky, 2003; Northcott, 2004) and the EU (e.g. Punt and 
Van Rooij, 2001; Vander Vennet, 2002; Hahn, 2005; and Yu and Neus 2005, to name 
a  few).  Usually  the  results  of  these  studies  are  mixed;  however  if  the  models 
incorporate explicit measures of efficiency they generally tend to find some support 
for the efficient structure hypotheses.  
 
2.2 Evidence from Developing Countries and Emerging Markets  
Recent research testing the market power and the efficient structure hypotheses have 
expanded  to  various  regions  in  the  world  including  developing  nations.  Only  a 
handful of recent studies test market power versus efficiency hypotheses in the Latin 
American banking sector and most of them are country-specific. Moreover, only a 
limited number of those studies uses sophisticated techniques to measure X- and scale 
efficiencies
4  (e.g., Carvallo and Kasman, 2004; Wong, 2004). Berstain and Fuentes 
(2005) study the relationship between banking concentration and price rigidity in  
Chile for the period of 1995 to 2002. They find that greater concentration in the 
banking sector in Chile has generated more rigidity in the deposit rates. Their findings 
are interpreted as being broadly in line with the SCP argument. Guerrero et al. (2005) 
study the Mexican banking industry focusing on 19 banks for the period 1997 to 2003 
and find evidence in support of the RMP hypothesis, thus rejecting the SCP and 
                                                 
4 Please see Section 3.2 for a discussion of alternative methodologies.   5 
efficient structure models. The authors use a balanced panel of banks which does not 
take into consideration merger and acquisition effects. They also estimate stochastic 
frontiers  to  obtain  bank  efficiency  measures  and  they  do  not  find  evidence  of  a 
positive relationship between profitability and X- or scale efficiency. Similarly, Park 
and Weber (2006) study the market power and efficient structure models for a sample 
of Korean banks for the period 1992 to 2002. They find that bank efficiency rather 
than concentration has a significant effect on bank profitability thereby giving support 
to the efficient structure model. 
Some other studies consider a large number of countries. For example, Beck et 
al. (2003) analyze the relationship between market structure and bank performance for 
364 banks operating in 8 Central and Eastern European Countries for the period 1998 
to 2001.  They reject the SCP hypothesis and accept the RMP, although they also 
observe  that  costs,  risks  and  reserve  ratios  are  important  determinants  of  bank 
performance. Gonzalez (2005) analyses efficiency and market power of the banking 
sectors in 69 countries, including Latin America, using 2,592 observations over 1996-
2002.    His  results  are  consistent  with  the  efficient  structure  hypothesis.  He  also 
acknowledges other relevant variables as significant determinants of profitability such 
as  bank  regulation,  supervision,  financial  structure  and  financial  development.  
Claessens et al. (2001) study 80 countries, including Latin America, from 1988 to 
1995 and investigate how profits,  net  interest  margins, overhead, and  taxes  differ 
between domestic and foreign banks. They find that in developing nations foreign 
investment is associated with higher profitability and high interest rates.  
Overall, it seems that only a few studies focus on the determinants of bank 
performance and profitability in Latin America. Moreover, the existing US and EU 
evidence does not suggest the development of a consensus in the literature. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by testing the SCP, RMP and efficient structure 
hypotheses  using  X-efficiency  and  scale  efficiency  measures.  We  obtain  these 
measures using the non-parametric DEA technique. As far as we know this is the first 
study to carry out a systematic analysis for a large sample of banks operating in a 
large  group  of  different  Latin  American  countries.  It  is  also  the  first  to  test  the 
efficient structure hypotheses using DEA efficiency estimates. 
   6 
3.  Methodology and data 
3.1 Model Specification and Methodology 
To  empirically  test  the  SCP  (Structure-Conduct-Performance),  RMP  (Relative-
Market-Power) models and the two efficient structure (ESX and ESS) hypotheses we 
use the following equation (Berger, 1995): 
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where  ROA  is  a  profitability ratio  calculated  as  net  income  over  total  assets ;  the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market structure calculated as the 









it t MS HHI . 
The HHI is chosen over other measures of  concentration since it accounts for all 
banks operating in the chosen market.  MS represents bank i ‟s share of assets at time 
t.  Based on the SCP argument, a positive impact of concentration on profitability 
would be indicative of collusion.  A positive sign on market share would support the 
relative  market  power  hypothesis,  thus  banks  with  a relatively  high  market  share 
would  be  able  to  set  prices  as  they  think  fit  without  facing  the  usual  market 
constraints. The relative market hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between 
MS and return on assets (ROA) and no role for HHI. ESX is a measure of managerial 
cost efficiency where firms with superior management have lower costs and therefore 
higher profits.  ESS is a measure of scale efficiency and refers to firms that have 
equally good management and technologies, but produce at more efficient scale than 
others. Following Berger (1995), if the efficient structure theory holds, then either or 
both the ESX and ESS are expected to be positive and significant. On the other hand 
HHI  and  MS  will  lose  their  explanatory  power  and  be  insignificantly  related  to 
profitability.   
The  vector  of  the  control  variables,  X  includes  a  number  of  firm-  and/or 
market- specific characteristics while Z is a vector of country-specific macroeconomic 
variables. Finally, the ε is the error term. More specifically the X can be written as 
follows: 
   7 
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where CAP is the degree of capitalisation measured as equity over assets, LTA  is a 
measure of liquidity risk measured as loan s over assets, and ASSETS is the  natural 
logarithm of total assets which is included as a proxy for bank size.  
The relationship between the degree of capitalisation (CAP) and profitability 
is typically expected to be negative since greater capital induces  banks to take less 
risk and thus earn less profit. Higher capital ratios, however, may also reflect lower 
expected bankruptcy (and hence lower funding costs) and/or higher incentives from 
the part of the shareholders to monitor management. In these cases,  the hypothesis is 
that higher capital ratios are associated with more profitable institutions. The variable 
LTA reflects the risk that banks have in terms of liquidity, therefore the higher the 
ratio,  the  more  aggressive  a  bank  should  be  towards  increasin g  profitability. 
According to Claeys and Vander Vennet (2003) high values of LTA should increase 
ROA  since  they  capture  the  banks‟  highest  yielding  type  of  assets.  Therefore,  a 
positive  relationship  between  LTA  and  ROA  is  expected.  Finally,  the  natural 
logarithm of total assets (ASSETS) is included as a proxy for size and is expected to 
be an important determinant of profitability if the banks are operating at increasing 
returns of scale.   
In addition, we specify the vector of the macroeconomics variables as  
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where XRATE is the average annual exchange rate; CPI is the average percentage 
change of the consumer price index; GDP is the average annual change in GDP ; and  
INT is the market interest rate.  There is no  a priori expected relationships between 
profitability and the exchange rate (XRATE) since the sign of its correlation with 
ROA may vary. The relationship between the inflation rate (CPI) and profitability is 
spurious  and  no  particular  sign  is  expected.  One  would  expect  that  a  positive 
relationship  between  GDP  growth  and  ROA  since  banking  profitability  is  pro-
cyclical.  Finally,  the  average  annual  market  interest  rate  and  its  relationship  with 
ROA may vary because on one hand higher market interest rates restrict economic   8 
activity  but  on  the  other  hand  they  push  commercial  interest  rates  on  the  same 
direction, potentially creating a more profitable business environment for banks. 
We estimate the model described in equation (1) using an unbalanced panel of 
data.  This  choice  was  dictated  by  two  main  reasons:  first,  to  account  for  the 
consolidation process that has taken place in some Latin American countries over the 




3.2  Estimating  Bank  Efficiency:  The  Data  Envelopment  Analysis  (DEA) 
Methodology 
The different methodologies for measuring efficiency can be divided into parametric 
and non-parametric. The dominant non-parametric approach is DEA which obtains 
efficiency  estimates  for  the  production  units  considered  and  creates  an  efficient 
frontier through the observed input-output ratios using mathematical programming 
techniques.  In  contrast  to  parametric  methods
6,  which define the efficient frontier 
through a functional form   and require  statistical distributions for the shocks and 
efficiency scores, DEA does not allow shocks to production or costs. Thus, DEA does 
not allow random shocks to affect the frontier and  interprets any deviation from the 
frontier  as a manifestation of  inefficiency.  A  consensus on which methodology 
efficiency-measuring frontier is preferable   has not yet been achieved  (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997; Goddard et al. 2001). Some of the most important advantages of the 
DEA methodology, however, include the lack of restrictions on the functional form, 
the different variables and values (e.g., ratios) which may be used, the possibility of 
measuring those variables in different units, and the fact that any deviations from the 
efficiency frontier are noticeable (e.g., see, Thanassoulis, 2001).   
The DEA was first used by Charnes  et. al. (1978) and ever since has been 
widely used to estimate efficiency in banking.  The DEA frontier is formed by “best-
practice  observations”  yielding  a  convex  production  possibility  set.  The  most 
commonly used DEA approach for measuring technical efficiency in banking is the 
input-oriented Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) model. That is, for a given output 
                                                 
5 The fixed effects panel data methods were assumed to be appropriate for estimating equation 1. We 
carry out the Hausman specification tests, however, to choose random versus fixed effects models. All 
computations are carried out with STATA. 
6 Examples of parametric techniques are the SFA (Stochastic Frontier Approach), DFA (Distribution 
Free Approach) and TFA (Thick Frontier Approach). See Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Berger 
(1993) and Berger and Humphrey (1992, 1997).   9 
level the use of the minimum input bundle that is found based on observed practice 
can still produce the required output level. The actually used input bundle is radially 
reduced.  We adopt this approach since banks usually tend to minimize costs, where 
output  is  normally  constrained  by  the  market  demand,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be 
controlled for. The VRS model yields what is known as pure (technical) efficiency 
scores. Scale efficiency is defined by the ratio of Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) to 
VRS, i.e., ESS = CRS/VRS and the value for scale efficiency is bounded by 0 and 1. 
More specifically, the VRS linear programming model we use is defined as follows: 





















            (4) 
 where   is a scalar,  is a N times 1 vector of constants,  i y is the output vector for 
the i-th DMU, Y is the matrix of outputs of the other DMUs and the number of DMUs 
ranges from i=1…n ;  i x  is a vector of input of the i-th DMU and X is the matrix of 
input of the other DMUs.  The value of    will be the efficiency score for the i-th 
DMU where 1 0   , if   is equal to 1, then the DMU lies on the efficient frontier 
and thus the observation is fully (i.e. 100%) efficient. When the convexity constraint 
11 N     is  omitted  from  (4)  we  obtain  the  CRS  based  efficiency  scores. The 
estimated DEA efficiency scores are then used as regressors in a second-stage  model 
in order to observe the relationship between efficiency and profitability (see Section 
3.1).




                                                 
7 Many papers have used DEA estimates of efficiency in „second stage‟ regressions, however there are 
limitations to this type of analyses. Simar and Wilson (2007) have pointed out that bootstrapping can 
help improve statistical efficiency in second stage regressions when non-parametric methods are used 
to  calculate  productive  efficiency.  In  the  parametric  approach,  these  problems  can  be  reduced  by 
employing a single-step estimation of the frontier and inefficiency equations (see e.g. Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki  et  al.,  2009).  Even  if  one  follows  the  parametric  approach,  however,  he  still  needs  to 
distinguish the part of technical efficiency due to random components versus the part that is explained 
by the explanatory variables.    10 
3.3 Data and Input/Output definition 
The data for this study was obtained from the BankScope database maintained by 
Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk.  The sample includes commercial banks operating in 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Uruguay  and 
Venezuela.  The  data  are  annual  and  cover  the  period  1997  to  2005.  The 
macroeconomic  variables  XRATE,  GDP,  CPI  and  INT  are  extracted  from  the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund.  
The  approach  to  output  definition  used  in  this  study  is  a  variation  of  the 
intermediation  approach,  which  was  originally  developed  by  Sealey  and  Lindley 
(1977) and posits that total loans and securities are outputs, whereas deposits along 
with labour and physical capital are inputs. Specifically we use the sum of personnel 
expenses, interest expenses, non-interest expenses and other operating expenses as 
inputs; whereas the output variables capture both the traditional lending activity of 
banks (total loans) and the growing non-lending activities (other earning assets) (see 
e.g. Beccalli et al., 2006).  
Table 1 reports the bank observations used for each country.  It is clear that the 
largest banking markets are in Brazil (around 100 banks on average per year) and 
Argentina (46 banks on average). In contrast, the country that presents the lowest 
number of observations per year is Peru (13 banks on average). The peculiarities of 
the banking markets in these Latin American countries can be inferred by looking at 
the average size of banks in terms of total assets. For example, the average bank in 
Brazil is roughly 2.5 larger that of Argentina and 30 times larger the one of Paraguay. 
In terms of trend over time, while the total number of banks seems to increase initially 
over  the  period  1997-2001  (as  probably  has  the  quality  of  data  available)  the 
consolidation wave appears to have affected the early 2000s as the number of banks 










Number of Banks Used in Each Latin American Country by Year 
 





















1997  10  82  13  22  10  n.a.  12  14  n.a.  163 
1998  42  92  20  22  16  17  19  15  10  253 
1999  67  94  22  20  17  21  16  13  36  306 
2000  64  101  23  22  18  21  16  24  40  329 
2001  69  115  24  22  20  19  13  37  36  355 
2002  62  114  24  23  20  17  12  34  33  339 
2003  50  101  24  24  18  13  11  27  32  300 
2004  30  98  24  23  16  13  11  27  33  275 
2005  23  92  24  18  17  13  9  17  25  238 
Total  417  889  198  196  152  138  119  208  248  2,565 
Average number  
of banks  46  99  22  22  17  17  13  23  31 
 
246 
Average asset  
size of banks 
(Millions of USD) 
 
1,426  4,073  3,118  1,171  322  140  1,185  667  727   
                     
Source: Bankscope. 
*Data from Venezuela and Paraguay was not available (n.a.) in 1997.   12 
 
Table 2 reports some key financial variables, including loans, deposits, assets, 
equity, NIM (net interest margin), ROA (return on assets) and ROE (return on equity). 
It  shows  that  there  are  also  marked  differences  across  countries  in  terms  of 
performance and balance sheet composition. We can observe that Brazil, Argentina 
and Chile dominate the region when analysing the amount of bank deposits, loans, 
assets  and equity. The  average net  interest  margin  is  significantly  high for Brazil 
(12.6%)  followed  by  Peru  (10.8%)  and  Venezuela  (9.5%).  The  region  reports  an 
average  net  interest  margin  of  7.52%,  that  is  considerably  high  if  compared  to 
industrial countries (e.g. around 4.17 % for US on average and 2.79% for UK, see 
Singh  et  al.  2005).
8  On the other hand,  Uruguay and Chile report the lowest net 
interest margin ratios at 1% and 5.1% respectively. In terms of cost over income, the 
region has an average of 69.25 % having Chile and Paraguay the largest ratios of 
105.21% and 84.31%. The most efficient countries in terms of cost /income ratios are 
Costa Rica and Peru.  
The profitability ratios (ROA and ROE) show an average in the region of 
1.89% and 16.44% respectively. Concerning ROA, the countries exhibiting the lowest 
values are Uruguay and Chile with 0.51 and 0.99, respectively; this latter country also 
reports a relatively low level of ROE at 10.19% . In contrast, the best  performing 
countries are Colombia and Venezuela. This is possibly due to  the current banking 










                                                 
8 We obtain data for the net interest margin for the US and UK from the Financial Structure Database 
of Beck et. al. (2000). 13 
 
Table 2 
Selected Balance Sheet Items and Performance Indicators (2005)  
 
  Deposits  Loans  Assets  Equity  Net Interest  
Rate Margin % 
 
Cost over  
Income % 
Return on  
Assets % 
Return on  
Equity % 
 
Argentina  60,098  24,838  70,931  7,290  6.18  79.15  0.63  6.53 
Brazil  390,435  208,422  605,670  60,454  12.6  77.13  2.4  15.93 
Chile  81,731  71,860  106,425  9,173  5.1  105.21  0.99  10.19 
Colombia  37,394  25,797  47,511  5,531  5.9  65.91  2.51  23.43 
Costa Rica  8,426  5,441  10,333  1021  7.59  63.53  2.22  17.5 
Paraguay
a  2009  991  2378  272  9.05  84.31  1.7  16.96 
Peru  19,932  12,326  23,377  2103  10.75  64.58  2.36  17.94 
Uruguay  9,910  5,866  11,046  850  1  84.42  0.51  13.17 
Venezuela
a  30,126  17,170  39,479  8149  9.50  78.03  3.66  26.32 
                 
Total   640,061  372,711  917,150  94,843  7.52  69.25  1.89  16.441 
Source: Bankscope. 
a The variables of deposits, loans, assets and equity are the sums (in million USD) of all the commercial banks of each of the 
countries in our sample in 2005. The variables of net interest margin, cost over income, return on assets and return on equity are 
the averages of the commercial banks for each of the countries in study. 14 
 
4. Results 
Tables 3 and 4 present the X- and scale efficiency scores calculated using the non-
parametric DEA methodology explained in section 3.2. It is important to note that 
these  scores  are  not  directly  comparable  across  countries  since  each  of  them  is 
computed using its own set of country-specific banks.  However it is interesting to 
examine the general trends for these Latin American countries as a whole and over 
time. 
  Average X-inefficiency scores  are around 32%  and they are slightly lower 
(25%) for scale inefficiencies. The results are generally higher than existing US and 
EU literature (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Goddard et al. 2001) however no doubt 
they reflect the substantial distress experienced by banks during the many financial 
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Peru  52.33  69.32  82.56  86.25  91.38  90.50  90.36  90.27  90.78 
 
+73  +0.31  +73 
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Venezuela
a  N.A.  88.30  48.56  46.60  66.44  50.48  59.69  67.94  84.20 
 
-43  +67  -5 
a Results for Paraguay and Venezuela for 1997 were not calculated due to data  availability. 
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Table 4 
Scale efficiency (ESS) scores, 1997-2005 (%) 
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a Results for Paraguay and Venezuela for 1997 were not obtained due to data  availability. 17 
 
Figure 1  (a)  shows the  average trends  in  X-  and scale  efficiency over  the 
period 1997 to 2005. Panel (c) in the same figure  clearly  shows that the average 
efficiency scores experienced a significant slump until 2002 (particularly in terms of 
X-efficiencies), most probably fuelled by the banking crisis experienced by Argentina 
and Brazil in 1999 and 2001 respectively. However, it is also apparent that the scores 
started to recover and grow in the following years (panel d).  
 
Figure 1 
X- and Scale efficiency trends vs ROA   






For completeness we also present the ROA trend over the same period (panel 
b) and it seems clear that it follows a trend similar to the estimated efficiency scores. 
Indeed the Pearson correlation coefficient confirms that there is a high and positive 
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panel (b)  18 
relationship  between  these  variables  (0.76  for  X-efficiencies  and  0.63  for  scale 
efficiencies).  
The next step is to run equation (1) as described in section 3.1 to empirically 
test  the  market  power  (SCP  and  RMP)  and  efficient  structure  (ESX  and  ESS) 
hypotheses. The final estimations are presented in Table 5. We apply a fixed effects 
panel data method that assumes heterogeneity between observations and considers the 
time effects. We carry out a number of tests in order to correct for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity,  particularly  the  Wooldridge  and  Wald  (group  wise)  tests 
respectively. We then choose between fixed and random effects models in accordance 






















Market power versus efficient structure hypotheses  





















HHI  -.043**  -.021  -.002  -.002  -.001*  -.03***  .001  .003  -.008 
MS  -.865  -.018  -.085*  .077  .096*  -.507**  -.136*  -1.328**  -1.054 
CAP  .06  .108***  .019  .57***  .098***  .207***  -.05  .5***  .244* 
LOATA  -.028  .014  -.009  .182  -.006  -.165**  -.028  .009  .14 
logASSETS  3.874*  .147  .81***  .728  .237  7.287***  3.508***  9.075***  7.968* 
ESX  6.366*  1.581*  -1.313  -1.997  .191  .732  -.345  2.839  -4.433 
ESS  2.968  1.244  2.445*  3.044  -.511  3.484**  1.767*  -5.134  3.181 
XRATE  .961  2.713***  -.022*  .001  .004  .001  -4.223**  .031  -.002 
CPI  -.164  -.29*  -.982*  -.297  -.033  -.001  .045  .146  .491** 
GDP  .408**  .349  -.983**  .466  -.049  -.19  -.011  -.34  .02 
INT  -.04  .669**  -.063  .082  -.05*  .18*  -.029  -.152  .19** 











Wald Heteroskedasticity test 
(p-value) 
 









































































































































  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in terms of assets, MS is the market share in terms of assets, 
CAP is the degree of capitalisation measured as equity over assets, LTA is the measure of liquidity risk measured as loans over assets, the logarithm of Assets is a measure of 
size, ESX is the managerial efficiency, ESS is the scale efficiency, the XRATE is the exchange rate, CPI is the inflation rate, GDP is the real growth of GDP and INT is the 
market interest rate.
a Fixed effects model was rejected. 
b A fixed effects model with AR(1) was run in Costa Rica to correct for autocorrelation. 20 
 
Table 5 shows that we do not find evidence to support the two market power 
hypotheses SCP and RMP: the value of HHI when significant is always negative (see 
results for Argentina, Costa Rica and Paraguay). This suggests an inverse relationship 
between concentration and profitability. Moreover, the MS coefficient is negative and 
significant in the majority of cases, thus indicating that greater market share is also 
reducing banking profitability. According to Goddard et al. (2001), a negative value in 
the  market  share  variable  could  signal  an  average  of  smaller  banks  being  more 
profitable than larger ones. The only country for which we find support for the RMP 
hypothesis  is  Costa  Rica  where  the  MS  coefficient  is  found  positively  and 
significantly related to  profitability  and the efficient structure hypothesis  does  not 
hold. This result can be explained by the fact that the largest three banks in Costa Rica 
hold more than 50% of the market share and this trend has increased over the period 
under study.
9  
Looking at the sign and significance of the coefficients for ESX and ESS, our 
results give considerable support to the efficient structure hypotheses. The ESX and 
ESS  coefficients are relatively high and  our  results  appear  robust for the largest 
banking markets in the region, namely Brazil, Argentina and Chile. However, ESX is 
found positive and significant only for Argentina and Brazil, while ESS seems to have 
a much more important role. ESS   is found positively related t o ROA in  Chile, 
Paraguay,  and  Peru.  Thus  in  these  countries  there  is  evidence  of  greater  scale 
efficiency producing greater profitability.  
From the bank specific factors, two of them seem to be particularly important 
in explaining these Latin American banks‟ performance: the degree of capitalisation, 
calculated  as  equity/assets  and  banks‟  assets  size.  The  coefficient  for  capital  is 
generally positive and significant for most countries under study thereby implying that 
greater  capital  available  increases  profitability.  As  observed  by  e.g.  Claeys  and 
Vander Vennet (2003) larger proportions of “free” capital can encourage banks to 
increase their portfolio of risky assets in the form of loans or securities. Moreover, 
higher capital ratios can give higher incentives to shareholders to monitor managers‟ 
operations  and  strategies  thereby  indirectly  encouraging  profitability.  Another 
variable that is found significant and positive in the majority of cases is the logarithm 
of total assets. This variable is included in the model to account for the effect of bank 
                                                 
9 The average market share for the 3 largest banks in Costa Rica for the period of 1997-2005 is 57.40%.    21 
size on bank profitability. Our findings could be interpreted as evidence that if banks 
are operating in the increasing returns portion of their average cost curve then bank 
profits are also positively affected (Dermiguc-Kunt et al., 2004). It also indicates that 
larger banks are more likely to operate at the most efficient scale. On the other hand, 
larger  banks  can  typically  pursue  riskier  investments  which  yield  higher  returns. 
Finally the evidence for the last bank-specific variable LTA (a measure of liquidity 
risk) is weak and cannot be generalised for the Latin American countries under study. 
In  particular  the  coefficient  is  found  negative  and  significant  only  for  Paraguay, 
remaining insignificant to the rest of the countries under study. 
The macroeconomic control variables show mixed results and the significance 
of  the  coefficients  is  less  strong  than  expected.  For  example,  the  exchange  rate 
displays a positive and significant relationship with the profitability ratio (ROA) in 
Brazil but a negative relationship in Chile and Peru. For the remaining countries the 
relationship with profits is insignificant. The exchange rate is included to account for 
macroeconomic  risk  and  we  did  not  have  any  specific  sign  expectations  for  this 
variable. Similarly the CPI and GDP growth seem to affect some Latin American 
countries  in  different  ways.  For  example,  in  Chile  the  relationship  between  these 
variables and profitability is negative and significant; while in Argentina the GDP 
growth affects ROA positively and in Venezuela inflation seems to increase banks‟ 
profits. Finally, the market interest rate, INT, is positive and significant in Brazil, 
Paraguay and Venezuela while is negatively related to ROA in Costa Rica. A possible 
explanation is that Brazil, Paraguay and Venezuela have had large reductions (27%, 
92% and 65% respectively) in their market interest rate during the period of study and 
this  change  has  generated  more  favourable  economic  conditions  for  the  banking 
sector. On the other hand, the negative relationship with INT and ROA in Costa Rica 
can be explained by the fact that Costa Rica‟s banking sector is dominated by few 
market  players,  and  any  adjustment  in  the  market  interest  rate  is  automatically 
transferred to  their  consumers, reducing the  amount  of credits  and other financial 
services.  
Overall  the  results  above  show  that  the  arguments  supporting  the  market 
power hypotheses are rejected for the Latin American countries under study, while 
efficiency gains, particularly in terms of scale efficiencies, appear to have a direct and 
significant  impact  on  banking  profitability.  The  results  seem  to  contradict  our 
expectations of increased market power that could have possibly derived from the   22 
gradual decline in the number of commercial banks in the majority of countries in the 
region,  a  parallel  increase  in  the  level  of  concentration,  and  a  sharp  increase  in 
takeovers from foreign commercial banks. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Over the last fifteen years or so the banking sector in some Latin American countries 
experienced profound changes due to deregulation and liberalisation that encouraged 
foreign  investments  and  merger  and  takeover  activities.  In  addition,  significant 
financial crises in the largest countries of the region have affected their economies and 
banking  sectors  as  a  whole.  The  wave  of  consolidation  and  the  rapid  increase  in 
market concentration that took place in the banking systems of most of these countries 
has generated concerns about the potential rise in banks‟ market power and implied 
detrimental effects on consumers.  
In  this  paper  we  test  empirically  the  Structure-Conduct-Performance  and 
Relative Market Power hypotheses versus two efficient-structure models (the X- and 
scale efficiency) to investigate whether banks earn supernormal profits because they 
are exercising market power or as a result of achieving higher efficiency levels. We 
estimate  managerial  and  scale  efficiency  by  employing  the  non-parametric  DEA 
technique. To our knowledge this is the first paper to provide such an investigation for 
a large sample of banks in nine Latin American countries over 1997-2005.  
Our results uncover evidence supporting the efficient structure hypotheses in 
some Latin American countries. The findings are particularly robust for the largest 
banking  markets  in  the  region,  namely  Brazil,  Argentina  and  Chile.  In  addition, 
capital ratios and bank size seem to be among the most important factors in explaining 
higher than normal profits for these Latin American banks. 
Our findings have direct policy implications, broadly suggesting that despite 
the  significant  rise  in  takeovers  from  foreign  banks  and  the  increase  in  market 
concentration, banks‟ profits do not seem to be explained by greater market power. In 
contrast, efficiency (particularly scale efficiency) seems to be the main driving force 
of increased profitability for most Latin American countries. The key implication is 
that  policies  aimed  at  removing  the  remaining  barriers  to  competition  should  be 
expected to benefit the banking system without being detrimental to consumers. On 
the  contrary,  intervention  aimed  at  achieving  “deconcentration”  should  be  viewed 
with  scepticism.  Implementing  pertinent  competition  policies  contributes  to  the   23 
efficient operation of the banking sector and as an extension (Beck et. al., 2000) to 
economic development and growth.  
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